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down	 [fourth	 grade	 student	 John	 Doe’s]	 pants	 and	 fondled	 hi[m],”	
school	 administrators	 had	 been	 receiving	 reports	 for	 six	 years	 of	




area.2	After	 learning	 of	 several	 instances	 of	 improper	 touching,	 the	
school	merely	admonished	Stroup	in	two	letters	and	in	person	not	to	
touch	 students	 in	 those	ways.3	Then,	 shortly	 after	 the	 principal	 re-
ceived	the	student’s	 letter	stating	that	Stroup	touched	the	student’s	
“public	areas,”	the	principal	departed	her	job	without	informing	her	
successor	 of	 the	 student’s	 letter	 or	 any	 of	 the	 concerns	 regarding	
Stroup.4	Given	the	fecklessness	of	the	school’s	responses	to	reports	of	
Stroup’s	 behavior,	 Stroup’s	 subsequent	 abuse	 of	 John	 Doe	 hardly	
seems	surprising.5	Yet,	when	John	Doe	brought	a	Title	IX	claim	against	





















the	 claim	 failed.6 	The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 school	 district	 had	 not	













































indifference	 to	 it.15	The	 deliberate	 indifference	 standard,	 therefore,	
sets	 the	minimum	bar	 for	 schools’	 responses	 to	 sexual	 harassment	






cases	 like	 John	 Doe’s.19	To	 the	 contrary,	 federal	 courts	 could	work	
within	 the	 standard’s	parameters	 to	articulate	Title	 IX’s	obligations	
forcefully	and	impose	liability	when	public	schools	act	as	vacuously	as	
in	John	Doe’s	case.20	Instead,	the	lower	courts’	assessments	send	the	
message	 that	 Title	 IX	 contains	 almost	 no	 obligations	 that	 the	K–12	




Explaining	 the	 deliberate	 indifference	 standard,	 the	 Supreme	
Court	 said	 that	 “at	 a	 minimum”	 it	 precludes	 schools’	 responses	 to	
known	sexual	harassment	that	“‘cause	[students]	to	undergo’	[addi-
tional]	 harassment	or	 ‘make	 them	 liable	 or	 vulnerable’	 to	 it.”23	The	

































Yet,	 in	 evaluating	 the	deliberate	 indifference	 standard	 in	K–12	
public	school	students’	Title	IX	claims,	the	lower	courts	disregard	this	














































institutional	betrayals	occur	when	an	 individual	 or	 institutional	 re-













by	 the	 thousands	 each	 year	 in	 the	 public	 schools.43 	From	 2011	 to	
2015,	at	least	17,000	K–12	public	school	students	reported	experienc-




















(AAUW),	CROSSING	 THE	 LINE:	 SEXUAL	HARASSMENT	 AT	 SCHOOL	 2	 (2011),	 https://www	
.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School	
.pdf	[https://perma.cc/SGD4-6MZB].	As	further	illustration	of	how	the	aggregate	num-










arly	 literature	on	Title	 IX	by	offering	an	original	 taxonomy	of	K–12	

















ondary	 schools	 report	 being	 “kissed	 or	 touched	without	 consent.”	 KAYLA	PATRICK	&	
NEENA	CHAUDHRY,	NAT’L	WOMEN’S	L.	CTR.,	LET	HER	LEARN:	STOPPING	SCHOOL	PUSHOUT	FOR	
































ard. 52 	Second,	 this	 Article	 develops	 a	 new	 legal	 presumption	 to	




proof	would	 then	 shift	 to	 the	 public	 schools	 to	 demonstrate	 other-










































trary,	 the	 deliberate	 indifference	 standard	 as	 described	 by	 the	 Su-
preme	 Court	 comports	 with	 Title	 IX’s	 protective	 purpose	 and	 can	
require	 that	 schools	 act	 to	 prevent	 the	 very	 harms	 that	 the	 lower	
courts	now	permit.	This	Part	contends,	however,	that	the	lower	courts	
eviscerate	the	deliberate	indifference	standard’s	protective	potential	
in	 evaluating	 K–12	 public	 school	 students’	 claims	 by	 cleaving	 the	
standard’s	 full	 meaning	 from	 their	 assessments	 of	 it.	 Further,	 the	
courts’	failure	to	require	more	of	schools	in	response	to	student	sexual	



























discrimination	 in	 the	public	schools.59	It	 said	 that	Congress	enacted	
Title	IX	because	it	“wanted	to	provide	individual	citizens	effective	pro-
tection	 against	 those	 [discriminatory]	 practices.” 60 	The	 Court	 also	
concluded	 that	 Title	 IX	 has	 an	 implied	 private	 right	 of	 action.61 	In	







lished	 deliberate	 indifference	 as	 the	 standard	 for	 assessing	 public	




























































12	 public	 schools	 to	 sexual	 harassment	 and	 assault,	 those	 myriad	
 




































These	 claims	 fail	 even	 though	 each	 of	 these	 three	 types	 of	 re-
sponses	has	real,	harmful	consequences	for	students.80	All	three	types	
put	students	at	risk	for	more	sexual	harassment	in	ways	that	deny	the	
students	 the	 educational	 benefits	 of	 school. 81 	They	 also	 indirectly	
cause	students	to	actually	suffer	further	sexual	harassment.82	In	addi-
tion,	these	inverted	responses	inflict	direct	harms	on	students.83	They	



















































































sponses	 should	 have	 more	 comprehensively	 addressed	 the	 larger	







v.	 Grainger	 County,	 multiple	 students	 repeatedly	 verbally	 harassed	
middle	 school	 student	 D.S.	 over	 the	 course	 of	 two	 school	 years. 95	
Among	 other	 things,	 the	 students	 called	 him	 “bitch,”	 “faggot,”	 and	
 
responded	to	the	harassment	“but	not	always,”	the	Fifth	Circuit	found	the	school	was	





instances	 of	 harassment	 by	 other	 students.	 511	 F.3d	 at	 1117.	 Although	 the	 school	
turned	 the	 investigation	over	 to	 law	enforcement,	when	 the	prosecutor’s	 office	 de-
clined	to	prosecute,	 the	school	then	did	nothing	at	all	at	school	 itself	 to	address	the	
harassment.	Id.	at	1123.	In	finding	the	school’s	failure	to	do	anything	at	that	point	not	
“deliberately	 indifferent,”	 the	Tenth	Circuit	noted	that	 the	school	need	not	have	en-
gaged	in	any	particular	discipline	of	the	students,	but	it	did	not	analyze	why	no	disci-
pline	or	other	response	by	the	school	to	the	sexual	harassment	sufficed.	Id.	It	thereby	






























erately	 indifferent	 to	 D.S.’s	 sexual	 harassment	 by	 noting	 that	 the	
school	did	investigate	some	of	the	sexual	harassment	and	discipline	
some	 of	 the	 students	 involved.99 	Effectively,	 then,	 the	 response	 to	
some	harassment	served	as	a	response	to	what	the	court	called	D.S.’s	
“overall”	experience	of	harassment.100	While	that	might	consequently	
suggest	 that	 a	 broader	 response	would	 be	 required	 to	 address	 the	
broader	nature	of	the	harassment,	the	court	avoided	such	a	conclusion	































































late	 the	 standard.	 For	 example,	 in	 Gabrielle	 M.	 v.	 Park	 Forest-Chicago	 Heights,	 the	
Seventh	Circuit	found	that	the	school’s	incompletely	implemented	response	to	kinder-






















For	 example,	 in	 Porto	 v.	 Town	 of	 Tewksbury,	 the	 First	 Circuit	
found	a	school	was	not	deliberately	 indifferent	despite	 its	 repeated	
use	of	 the	same	failed	response	to	the	harassment	of	eight-year-old	
student	S.C.106	S.C.,	who	had	generalized	developmental	delays,	 suf-








assment.110 	Instead,	 the	 school’s	 interventions	 allowed	 the	 harass-












































boys	 had	 stopped	 the	 harassment. 123 	It	 determined	 that	 because	
weeks	and	sometimes	months	went	by	without	reports	of	more	sexual	








though,	 the	court	avoided	evaluating	the	 inadequacy	of	 the	school’s	
repeated	partial	separation	interventions	in	this	way.127	Declining	to	








































repeated	use	of	 reprimands—both	verbal	 and	written—in	 response	 to	multiple	 re-
ports	 that	 teacher	Gary	Stroup	had	 inappropriately	 touched	elementary	 school	 stu-

















of	 deliberate	 indifference	 into	 a	matter	 of	 simply	 counting	whether	 a	 response	 oc-
































Stiles	 v.	 Grainger	 County,	 the	 court	 not	 only	 found	 the	 school’s	 occasional	 non-re-
sponses	not	deliberately	indifferent,	but	it	also	found	its	punishment	and	blame	of	D.S.	
not	deliberately	indifferent.	819	F.3d	834,	852–53	(6th	Cir.	2016).	The	court	described	
how	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 two	 school	 years	 of	 harassment	 endured,	 a	 police	 official	
working	with	 the	school	on	the	harassment	“blam[ed]	D.S.	 for	 the	 incidents,	stating	
that	D.S.	could	defend	himself,	and	recommending	that	D.S.	learn	martial	arts.”	Id.	at	
















ing,	 particularly	 coupled	with	 the	nature	 of	K.C.’s	 disability,	 arguably	 operates	 as	 a	











school	 offered	 “alternatives	 to	 CF	 attending	 high	 school,”	 the	 court	
found	 that	 the	school	did	not	act	with	deliberate	 indifference.143	Ig-
noring	that	these	types	of	interventions	amount	to	a	form	of	punish-
ment,	courts,	like	the	Fifth	Circuit	in	K.F.,	permit	schools	to	punish	stu-






tecting	 students.145	Instead,	 these	 three	 types	of	 responses	put	 stu-
dents	at	risk	for	further	sexual	harassment	such	that	they	lose	educa-










































































consequences.156	Such	was	 the	 case	 in	Rost	 ex	 rel.	K.C.	 v.	 Steamboat	
Springs	RE-2	School	District,	where	the	Tenth	Circuit	denied	the	claim	
of	middle	school	student	K.C.,	a	student	with	a	brain	injury,	who	was	
repeatedly	 sexually	 harassed	 and	 assaulted	 by	 fellow	 students. 157	
Among	other	 things,	 the	other	students	called	her	names,	 “continu-
ously	pestered	her	for	oral	sex,”	and	“threatened	to	distribute	naked	
photographs	 of	 her.”158 	In	 response,	 the	 school	 did	 nothing	 in	 the	
school	setting	to	address	the	harassment.159	It	only	turned	the	inves-













































Schools	 do	not	 just	 put	 students	 at	 risk	 for	 sexual	 harassment	
with	these	vapid	responses	to	student	sexual	harassment;	 they	also	
indirectly	cause	students	to	actually	suffer	additional	sexual	harass-












































letter	had	not	 stopped	 that	 same	behavior.175	Then,	when	principal	
Dora	Kunz	later	received	a	letter	from	a	student	stating	that	teacher	








lowed	 Stroup’s	 behavior	 to	 continue	 and	 so	 indirectly	 caused	 it.179	









bly,	 those	 failures	did	not	stem	the	 tide	of	harassment,	and	D.S.	 continued	 to	suffer	
harassment	by	other	students.	819	F.3d	at	841–45.	The	school’s	failures	to	respond	at	
times,	therefore,	not	only	exposed	D.S.	to	this	additional	harassment,	but	it	paved	the	




harassment	 began	with	 name-calling	 and	 escalated	 to	 slapping	 and	pushing,	 some-
times	by	multiple	students	at	one	time.	Id.	at	781–82.	Similarly,	kindergartener	Gabri-
elle	M.’s	elementary	school	effectively	allowed	student	Jason	to	continue	harassing	Ga-













Stroup’s	 assaults	 left	 Tracy	 unable	 to	 address	 or	 prevent	 them.182	
Kunz’s	failure	to	apprise	Tracy	of	Stroup’s	abusive	behavior	permitted	










































































riences	with	Military	 and	Civilian	 Social	 Systems,	 29	PSYCH.	WOMEN	Q.	97,	 97	 (2005)	
(“[V]ictim-blaming	attitudes,	behaviors,	and	practices	.	.	.	[result]	in	additional	trauma	
for	 sexual	 assault	 survivors.”);	 Maier,	 supra	 note	 39,	 at	 291;	 see	 also	 SHRIVER	CTR.,	
ENSURING	SUCCESS	 IN	SCHOOL,	SUPPORTING	SURVIVORS	1,	20	 (2018),	https://news.wttw	
.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/Shriver%20report_draft%204%	























whose	 Title	 IX	 claim	was	 rejected	 by	 the	 Fifth	 Circuit,	 experienced	
these	traumas.199	When	K.S.’s	school	punished	him	because	he	fought	
back	after	enduring	multiple	instances	of	harassment,	K.S.	poignantly	
stated	 that	 the	 school’s	 response	made	 him	 feel	 that	 “nothing	 ever	
































































































The	 deliberate	 indifference	 standard,	 as	 articulated	 by	 the	 Su-







cluding	 schools’	 responses	 to	 known	 sexual	 harassment	 that	
indirectly	cause	or	put	students	at	risk	for	further	such	harassment.210	
The	deliberate	 indifference	standard	can,	 therefore,	hold	schools	 to	
account	 for	 their	 intermittent	 failures	 to	 respond	 to	 student	 sexual	
harassment,	their	repeated	use	of	failed	responses	to	it,	and	their	re-
sponses	that	punish	and	blame	survivors	because	all	such	responses	























students	 continue	 to	 suffer	 sexual	 harassment	 and	 whether	 the	
school’s	response	risked	or	caused	it.215	They	consequently	void	the	





















































harassment	 until	 they	 have	 actual	 notice	 that	 some	 has	 occurred,	
 
§	12.12(2)(b).	The	same	holds	true	for	other	sorts	of	tort	claims,	such	as	those	brought	





















student-on-student	 harassment	 in	 its	 schools.”).	 To	 that	 end,	 in	 Gebser,	 the	 Court	
quoted	 its	 §	1983	 police	 liability	 cases,	 including	Board	 of	 Commissioners	 v.	 Brown,	
when	settling	on	the	deliberate	 indifference	standard	for	determining	such	 liability.	
Gebser,	524	U.S.	at	291.	In	doing	so,	it	said	that	“[c]omparable	considerations	[to	those	
























schools	 to	 account	 for	 indirectly	 causing	 students’	 sexual	 harass-
ment.224	It	explained	that	schools	would	be	held	liable	for	causing	sex-
ual	harassment	even	though	schools	“[do]	not	engage	in	the	harass-
ment	 directly.” 225 	This	 limitation	 on	 the	 causal	 component	 of	
deliberate	indifference	is	the	natural	result	of	the	Court’s	formulation	
of	the	actual	notice	prong	of	its	actual	notice-deliberate	indifference	




























































































any	 student	 faces	 given	 the	 high	 rate	 at	 which	 it	 occurs	 in	 public	
schools.233	This	 risk	 is	a	particularized	one	 in	 that	 it	exists	only	be-











Liable,	 MERRIAM	 WEBSTER,	 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liable	



















the	 discriminatory	 conduct	 in	 question.’”	 (citations	 omitted)	 (quoting	 Baynard	 v.	
Malone,	268	F.3d	228,	237–38	(4th	Cir.	2001))).	Once	schools	have	actual	notice	that	















ence	 implicitly	 require	 that	 schools	 take	 affirmative	 steps	 to	 avoid	
causing	or	putting	students	at	risk	for	further	sexual	harassment.236	
Because	the	only	way	for	a	school	to	avoid	putting	students	at	risk	for	







standard	 does	 not	mandate	 that	 schools’	 interventions	 remedy	 the	







whether	 schools’	 responses	 to	 student	 sexual	 harassment	 put	 stu-
dents	at	risk	for	or	caused	further	sexual	harassment,	the	courts	eval-



































Court	went	 on	 to	 offer	 further	 guidance	 about	 the	 standard.245 	Re-
sponding	to	the	dissent’s	objections	about	the	implications	of	impos-
ing	Title	IX	liability	for	peer	sexual	harassment,	the	Court	said	that	de-
liberate	 indifference	 requires	 schools	 to	 respond	 to	 sexual	






ble	because	 it	neither	makes	a	 student	vulnerable	 to	nor	 indirectly	
causes	further	sexual	harassment.248	Put	the	other	way,	a	clearly	un-
reasonable	 response	 is	 one	 that	puts	 students	 at	 risk	 for	 or	 causes	
their	further	sexual	harassment.249	
More	 specifically,	 when	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 offered	 this	 “not	
clearly	 unreasonable”	 guidance,250 	it	 was	 addressing	 the	Davis	 dis-











































































reasonableness	 language	 operates	 in	 conjunction	 with	 those	 con-






































































































address	 student	 R.C.’s	 ongoing	 sexual	 harassment	 of	 elementary	




	 265.	 See	K.S.	v.	Nw.	 Indep.	Sch.	Dist.,	689	F.	App’x	780,	784,	786	(5th	Cir.	2017)	
(considering	 that	 the	 school	 “took	 some	 action	 in	 response	 to”	 sixth	 grade	 student	
K.S.’s	repeated	sexual	harassment,	the	court	found	the	school	did	not	act	clearly	unrea-

















described	the	principal’s	“demeanor	toward	him	as	 ‘supportive.’”	 Id.	 In	determining	
deliberate	indifference,	however,	the	court	concluded	that	without	more	“we	cannot	
say	.	.	.	that	these	actions,	though	ineffective	in	preventing	McGrew	from	sexually	abus-

















peatedly	 separated	 the	 students	 in	 limited	 ways	 to	 virtually	 no	





dent	 harassment	 is	 not	 one	 of	 effectiveness	 by	 hindsight.”271	To	 be	
sure,	ineffectiveness	alone	does	not	suffice	to	demonstrate	clear	un-







S.C.	 at	 risk	 for	 and	 indirectly	 caused	 his	 additional	 sexual	 harass-
ment.275 	By	 knowingly	 and	 repeatedly	 implementing	 this	 failed	 re-
sponse,	 the	 school	did	virtually	nothing	 to	prevent	R.C.’s	 continued	
harassment	and	allowed,	or	indirectly	caused,	its	recurrence.276	Con-
sequently,	the	court	could	have	found	the	school	acted	clearly	unrea-






























dent	 Gabrielle	 suffered	 multiple	 sexual	 assaults	 by	 fellow	 kinder-
gartner	 Jason,	 the	 school	 decided	 the	 children	 needed	 to	 be	




school	 district’s	 response	 to	 Jason’s	 inappropriate	 conduct	was	not	
clearly	 unreasonable.	 After	 each	 reported	 or	 observed	 instance	 in-
volving	Jason	and	other	students	.	.	.	steps	were	taken	to	prevent	fu-













dent	 sexual	 harassment,	 they	 consistently	 forego	 an	 evaluation	 of	
whether	such	responses	indirectly	caused	or	put	students	at	risk	for	
more	 sexual	 harassment.287 	Reducing	 deliberate	 indifference	 to	 an	
 


















assessment	of	 clear	unreasonableness	 alone,	 as	 they	 independently	






potential,	 however,	 they	 could	 proscribe	 these	 responses	 and	 their	
consequent	harms.290	





















































laws	 failed	 to	 provide	 students	 protection	 from	 sexual	 harassment	
and	other	forms	of	sex	discrimination	in	the	public	schools,	the	lower	
courts’	assessments	of	the	deliberate	indifference	standard	allow	the	
very	harm	 the	 law	 seeks	 to	prevent.295	Further,	 because	 courts’	 as-
sessments	particularly	affect	K–12	public	school	students’	claims,	the	
courts’	problematic	interpretations	are	a	matter	of	urgency	because	
these	 students	 face	unique	vulnerabilities.296	Other	 laws	offer	 addi-
tional	protections	from	sexual	harassment	and	assault	to	college	and	
university	 students,	 but	 younger	 students	 do	 not	 have	 these	 same	
structural	protections.297	Further,	 younger	 students	 are	more	 likely	
than	older	students	to	suffer	certain	long-term	harms	from	sexual	har-
assment	and	assault.298		
While	 federal	 laws,	 notably	 the	Clery	Act,	 require	 colleges	 and	





	 294.	 See	Davis,	 526	 U.S.	 629;	 supra	 note	 60	 and	 accompanying	 text;	 supra	 Part	
II.B.2.	


















forcible	 sex	offenses	 that	occur	on	campus,	 in	 campus	buildings	off	
campus,	and	on	public	property.300	In	addition,	colleges	and	universi-















ments	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 participation	 in	 federal	 financial	 assistance	 programs.	 Id.	
§	1092(f).	
	 301.	 Id.	§	1092(f)(8).	Such	programs	must	include	information	on	the	definitions	














[Although]	32	 states	 and	 the	District	 of	Columbia	 track	 student	 sexual	 as-
saults	.	.	.	some	did	so	only	if	incidents	led	to	discipline	like	suspension	or	ex-
pulsion;	the	other	states,	including	Maine,	did	not.	.	.	.	[Consequently	s]ome	of	











further	weaken	 the	 already	 relatively	 low	 threshold	 of	 protections	
available	to	K–12	public	school	students.306	
Not	only	do	K–12	public	school	students	lack	these	more	compre-





































ization	 in	 the	 History	 of	 Sexual	 Abusers:	 A	 Review,	 1	 ANNALS	 OF	 SEX	RSCH.	 485,	 495	
(1988).	
	 311.	 E.g.,	Elizabeth	J.	Letourneau	&	Charles	Borduin,	The	Effective	Treatment	of	Ju-
veniles	Who	Sexually	Offend:	An	Ethical	 Imperative,	 18	ETHICS	&	BEHAV.	 286,	298–99	
(2008).	 This	 study	described	 the	 positive	 outcomes	 for	 reducing	 recidivism	among	
sexual	aggressive	juveniles	with	the	use	of	multisystemic	therapy	(MST).	Id.	In	the	MST	
model,	“the	youth	is	viewed	as	being	nested	within	a	complex	of	interconnected	sys-





















the	youth’s	behavior	 is	 seen	as	 the	product	of	 the	 reciprocal	 interplay	be-
tween	the	youth	and	these	systems	and	of	the	relations	of	the	systems	with	
each	other.	.	.	.	It	is	assumed,	then,	that	youth	behavior	problems	such	as	sex-





































standard	 such	 that	 its	 implicit	 demand	 for	 schools	 to	 affirmatively	
protect	 students	 from	 sexual	 harassment	 and	 assault	 is	 made	 ex-
plicit.317	This	Part	also	offers	a	 framework	for	the	evaluation	of	 this	
recast	standard.318	This	standard	and	framework	ensure	that	schools’	
failures	 to	 respond	even	 intermittently	 to	 reports	of	 sexual	harass-
ment,	their	repeated	use	of	failed	responses	without	justification,	and	
their	responses	that	punish	or	blame	survivors	violate	Title	IX.319	In	
addition,	 this	 Part	 develops	 a	 new	 legal	 presumption	 aimed	 at	
prompting	schools	to	meaningfully	design	their	responses	to	student	




them	 further	 sexual	 harassment,	 but	 they	would	 also	 apply	 to	 and	





























remedying	 or	 preventing	 student	 sexual	 harassment.	 The	 Supreme	
Court’s	statements	on	that	point	notwithstanding,	one	might	reasona-
bly	be	skeptical.322	Damages	certainly	cannot	truly	remediate	a	harm	
like	 sexual	 harassment	 that	 leaves	 deep,	 lasting	 wounds. 323 	Yet,	 a	
damages	 remedy	 nevertheless	 serves	 at	 least	 two	 important	 func-
tions.	First,	a	damages	remedy	signals	general	social	recognition	of	the	
injustice	meted	out	by	the	state.324	Second,	 it	can	prompt	structural	
reforms	 that	 prevent	 future	 civil	 rights	 violations.325	Even	 scholars	
 
	 322.	 Scholars	 have	 expressed	 concerns	with	 the	 value	 and	 efficacy	 of	 damages	
awards	 and	 the	 imposition	of	 liability	 on	 the	 government	 in	 at	 least	 some	kinds	of	

















of	 emotional	 and	 physical	 trauma	 on	 fire	 victims	 and	 concluding	 that	 “[s]urvivors	
[who]	experienced	physical	and	emotional	trauma	(those	with	burn	injuries)	demon-
strate	 the	same	outcomes	as	 those	 that	experienced	emotional	 trauma	alone	(those	
without	burn	injuries).	Our	analysis	suggests	that	non-physical	trauma	is	the	primary	
determinant	of	 these	outcomes	 [including	post-traumatic	 stress	 and	depression].”);	
see	also	City	of	Riverside	v.	Rivera,	477	U.S.	561,	562	(1986)	(“Unlike	most	private	tort	






fits	 that	are	not	 reflected	 in	nominal	or	 relatively	 small	damages	awards.”	 (quoting	
Hensley	v.	Eckerhart,	461	U.S.	424,	444	n.4	(1983))).	
	 325.	 Id.	at	575	(“In	addition,	the	damages	a	plaintiff	recovers	contributes	signifi-
cantly	 to	 the	deterrence	 of	 civil	 rights	 violations	 in	 the	 future.”).	Myriam	Gilles	 de-
scribes	these	effects	as	“fault-fixing	functions”	in	the	municipal	liability	context.	Myr-



















ference	 standard	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 to	 its	 evalua-
tion.331	Despite	their	relative	restraint,	these	proposals	are	not	with-


































In	 the	 current	 analysis,	 the	 lower	 courts	 divorce	 the	 complete	
















	 334.	 See	 supra	notes	 58–60	 and	 accompanying	 text	 (discussing	 the	 protections	
that	Title	IX	is	intended	to	afford	to	students).	































assment	and	assault	 to	determine	whether	 they	are	 reasonably	de-
signed	 to	 protect	 students	 against	 risking	 or	 causing	more	 harass-
ment.	 Absent	 such	 reasonable	 design,	 schools’	 responses	 are	
inadequate	to	the	task	of	preventing	or	addressing	further	sexual	har-

















constitutes	an	 inadequate	response.339	If	 the	deliberate	 indifference	
standard	explicitly	requires	schools	to	affirmatively	protect	students	
























First,	 factors	 for	assessing	 such	a	 reasonable	design	 should	 in-
clude	 inquiring	 into	whether	 the	 school	made	 reasonable	efforts	 to	
identify	the	source	of	the	problem	and	address	it.	Only	once	the	source	





self.341	Alternatively,	 the	 source	 of	 the	 problem	 could	 be	 a	 broader	
school	climate	 issue,	as	seemingly	was	 the	case	 in	Stiles	v.	Grainger	
County,	where	a	middle	school	student,	D.S.,	suffered	repeated	harass-
ment	over	two	school	years	by	over	ten	students.342	










not	 suffice	 to	 address	 a	 larger	 school	 climate	 problem	 as	 in	 Stiles,	

























































response	was	 inadequate.	However,	 if	 a	 school	 continues	 to	use	 that	unavailing	 re-
sponse,	then	that	continued	use	does	demonstrate	that	the	school	used	an	inadequate	
































D.S.	by	providing	him	counseling,	 the	option	of	a	 school	 transfer	 to	
avoid	seeing	the	students	who	harassed	him,	or	both.	Yet,	despite	such	
meaningfully	 designed	 interventions,	 a	 student,	 for	 example,	 could	
still	find	D.S.	at	a	school	sporting	event	and	harass	him.	The	fact	that	









































to	 affirmatively	 act	 to	 protect	 students.	 Courts	 should	 categorically	
conclude	such	non-responses	are	clearly	unreasonable	and	deliber-
ately	 indifferent. 352 	Such	 a	 categorical	 prohibition	 on	 inaction	 by	
schools	would,	as	with	the	reasonable	design	framework	itself,	not	re-
quire	specific	actions,	but	 it	would	require	schools	 to	do	something	






































the	 opposite	 of	 affirmatively	 protecting	 them.	 Courts,	 therefore,	
should	categorically	conclude	that	schools’	responses	that	inflict	sec-
ondary	trauma	or	institutional	betrayals	are	clearly	unreasonable	re-














sexual	 harassment	 and	 assault	 that	middle	 school	 student	K.C.	 suf-
fered,	 that	 non-response	 would	 violate	 the	 deliberate	 indifference	
standard.364 	Likewise,	 although	 kindergartner	 Gabrielle	M.’s	 school	
did	not	fail	to	intervene	in	response	to	her	harassment	by	another	kin-
dergarten	 student,	 its	 decision	 to	 intervene	by	 separating	Gabrielle	
from	her	abuser	but	then	not	fully	implementing	that	response	would	
 












count	 because	 even	 if	 the	 response	 could	 be	 called	 reasonably	 de-
signed	to	address	the	source	of	the	harassment,	the	fact	that	it	was	not	
fully	implemented	means	its	implementation	eliminated	elements	of	





egorically	 clearly	 unreasonable. 368 	Consequently,	 it	 too	 would	
contravene	 the	 revised	deliberate	 indifference	standard	and	violate	
Title	IX.	
B. A	PRESUMPTION	OF	DELIBERATE	INDIFFERENCE	
One	goal	underlying	 these	recommended	changes	 is	 to	prompt	
schools	 to	meaningfully	 consider	how	 to	 respond	 to	 student	 sexual	
harassment	in	order	to	protect	against	and	address	it.	Achieving	such	
meaningful	responses	would	do	substantial	work	to	accomplish	Title	
IX’s	 purpose	 of	 protecting	 students	 from	 sexual	 harassment	 in	 the	
public	schools.369	A	new	legal	presumption	in	Title	IX	cases	aimed	at	
schools’	 repeated	 use	 of	 failed	 responses	 to	 student	 sexual	 harass-
ment	would	further	that	goal.370	Under	this	presumption,	if	a	student	
could	demonstrate	that	a	school	repeated	a	failed	intervention	in	re-




























prevent	 more	 sexual	 harassment,	 its	 reuse	 of	 that	 same	 response	
holds	little	hope	of	preventing	or	addressing	the	sexual	harassment.372	
The	 repeated	 implementation	 of	 failed	 responses	 to	 student	 sexual	
























To	 establish	 such	 a	 reasonable	 justification,	 the	 school	 would	 first	
































This	proposed	 legal	presumption,	 like	 the	standard	and	 frame-
work	it	serves,	would	change	the	outcomes	in	some	Title	IX	cases.	For	
example,	 in	Porto,	 after	 the	elementary	 school	 learned	 that	 student	
R.C.	harassed	and	assaulted	S.C.,	the	school	repeatedly	separated	the	
boys’	 classroom	seats	 in	addition	 to	 separating	 them	on	 the	bus.376	
The	repetition	of	this	failed	physical	separation	response	would	trig-
ger	 the	 presumption	 of	 deliberate	 indifference.377 	Absent	 any	 evi-
dence	to	rebut	the	proof	of	the	intervention’s	repetition,	the	school’s	
consideration	of	alternative	 interventions,	or	a	 reasonable	 justifica-
tion	for	its	repeated	use	of	those	physical	separations,	the	court	would	
be	constrained	to	find	that	the	school	acted	with	deliberate	indiffer-













































historically	 used	 civil	 rights	 preponderance	 standard	 with	 the	 quasi-criminal	 C&C	
[clear	 and	 convincing]	 evidence	 standard”	 and	 is	 part	 of	 a	 “larger	 and	 longer	 war	
against	civil	rights	and	equal	educational	opportunity”);	Janet	Napolitano,	Don’t	Let	the	
Trump	 Administration	 Undermine	 Title	 IX,	WASH.	POST	 (Dec.	 4,	 2018),	 https://www	
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/janet-napolitano-don’t-let-the-trump-administration	
-undermine-title-ix/2018/12/04/6c91f316-f7fc-11e8-863c-9e2f864d47e7_story	





























like	 the	 IDEA,	 should	mandate	 that	 schools	 develop	 a	written	 plan	
upon	a	report	of	a	student’s	sexual	harassment.	The	schools	should	be	







manding	meaningful,	 reasonably	 designed,	 consistent	 responses	 to	
every	report	of	student	sexual	harassment.	
D. CRITIQUES	AND	THEIR	ANSWERS	
Virtually	 any	 time	 a	 public	 system’s	 potential	 for	 liability	 in-
creases,	so	do	concerns	about	moral	hazard	and	informational	error	

























on	 schools. 386 	Because	 the	 recommendations	 here	 would	 both	 in-





















































































by	 the	 Southern	 Education	 Foundation	 found	 that	 51%	 of	 students	 in	 the	 public	
schools	live	in	poverty.	S.	EDUC.	FOUND.,	A	NEW	MAJORITY:	LOW	INCOME	STUDENTS	NOW	A	













Loss-spreading	 principles	 and	 liability	 insurance,	 however,	 do	
not	 address	 concerns	 about	 informational	 error	 costs.398	Such	 con-
cerns	focus	on	the	costs	involved	with	courts	in	developing	the	insti-




	In	 Title	 IX	 cases,	 courts	 express	 concerns	 about	 informational	
costs	when	they	disclaim	any	basis	for	or	authority	to	involve	them-
selves	in	school	pedagogy	or	discipline.401	Yet,	such	qualms	about	the	
courts’	 institutional	 capacity	 are	 largely	 unfounded	 in	 the	 Title	 IX	
 
-insurance-purchases/2015/10	 [https://perma.cc/G77G-VCDN];	 see	 also	 Dave	 Ar-
nold,	 Insuring	 Your	 Good	 Name,	 NAT’L	 EDUC.	 ASS’N,	 http://web.archive.org/web/	
20200714040800/https://www.nea.org/home/14629.htm	 [https://perma.cc/4AVZ	































































































and	 expelling	 them,	 for	 all	 manner	 of	 school	 discipline	 code	 viola-
tions.410	If	the	public	schools	face	increased	potential	liability	for	fail-
ing	to	respond	or	respond	adequately	to	student	sexual	harassment,	

























	 410.	 E.g.,	Halley,	 supra	 note	382,	 at	107	 (arguing	 that	 “the	general	 social	disad-
vantage	that	black	men	continue	to	carry	in	our	culture	can	make	it	easier	for	everyone	
in	the	adjudicative	process	to	put	the	blame	on	them”);	Bazelon,	supra	note	382	(argu-
ing	 that	 racial	 implications	of	 the	 current	 title	 IX	 standards	demand	 reform,	noting	
“[w]e	have	long	over-sexualized,	over-criminalized	and	disproportionately	punished	
black	men.	It	should	come	as	no	surprise	that,	in	[the	Title	IX	enforcement]	setting	in	







these	 proposals,	 however,	 suggests	 that	 the	method	 for	 addressing	





interventions	because	 it	would	not	address	 the	 source	of	 the	prob-
lem.414	While	it	would	temporarily	remove	such	children	from	school,	
such	removals	are	not	permanent.415	Without	connecting	students	to	
mental	 health	 services,	 therefore,	 schools	 can	 virtually	 expect	 the	
problems	 to	 recur.416	Far	 from	suspending	and	expelling	 those	 stu-
dents,	therefore,	the	public	schools	would	do	far	more	to	avoid	liabil-
ity	 by	 treating	 it	 in	 those	ways.	While	 not	 insignificant,	 then,	 all	 of	
these	 critiques	 have	 answers,	 and	 as	 such,	 they	 do	 not	 obviate	 the	





















§	48917(a)	 (1996).	 See	 generally	 CHILD	TRENDS	&	EMT	ASSOCS.,	 INC.,	COMPENDIUM	 OF	
SCHOOL	DISCIPLINE	LAWS	AND	REGULATIONS	FOR	THE	50	STATES,	DISTRICT	OF	COLUMBIA	AND	








students	 further	 sexual	 harassment,	 the	 standard	 can	 require	 that	
schools	take	affirmative	steps	to	accomplish	these	ends.	Yet	in	their	








deliberate	 indifference	 standard	 needs	 to	 explicitly	 require	what	 it	
now	 only	 implicitly	 demands.	 The	 deliberate	 indifference	 standard	
should	 mandate	 that	 schools	 affirmatively	 protect	 students	 from	
known	sexual	harassment.	 In	addition	 to	recommending	 this	 recast	
standard,	this	Article	proposes	a	framework	for	its	evaluation.	It	also	
develops	a	new	legal	presumption	such	that	when	a	school	repeats	the	
use	of	failed	responses	to	sexual	harassment,	courts	would	presume	
that	the	school	acted	with	deliberate	indifference.	Finally,	this	Article	
advances	Title	IX	regulatory	changes	to	reinforce	the	protections	that	
the	law	seeks	to	provide.	These	proposals	offer	the	promise	of	rein-
vigorating	Title	IX’s	purpose	and	preventing	and	addressing	student	
sexual	harassment	in	schools.	
 
